Notwithstanding which, it-was far from our intention therefore to conclude, that nothing neither in Nature nor Providence could be otherwise than it is; or that there is nothing left to the free will and choice of the Deity. And though we do, in the third section, insist largely upon that ancient Pythagoric Cabala, that souls are always united to some body or other, as also, that all rational and intellectual creatures consist of soul and body; and suggest several things from reason and Christian: antiquity in favour of them both; yet would we not be understood to dogmatize in either of them, but to submit all to better judg-ments.

Agah), we shall here advertise the reader (though We have cautioned concerning it in the book itself), that in our defence of incorporeal substance against the Atheists, however we thought ourselves concerned to say the utmost that possibly we could, in way of vindication of the ancients, who generally maintained it to be unextended (which to some seems an absolute impossibility) ; yet we would not be supposed ourselves dogmatically to assert any more in this point than what all incor-porealists agree in, that there is a substance specifically distinct from body ; namely, such as con-sisteth not of parts separable from one another, and which can penetrate body, and lastly, is self active, and hath an internal energy, distinct from that of local motion. And thus much is undeniably evinced by the arguments before proposed. But whether this substance be altogether unextended, or extended otherwise than body, we shall leave every man to make his own judgment concerning it.